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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present our ideas for conducting a cost 
benefit analysis by using three different methods: 
scenario analysis, decision trees and simulation. Then 
we introduce our case study and examine these methods 
in a real world situation. We show how these tools can 
be used and what the results are for each of them. Our 
aim is to conduct a comparison of these different 
probabilistic methods of estimating costs for port 
security risk assessment studies. Methodologically, we 
are trying to understand the limits of all the tools 
mentioned above by focusing on rare events. 
 
Keywords: port security, cargo screening, modelling 
and simulation, cost benefit analysis. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of cost benefit analysis is described in the 
literature from the early 19th century. Already at that 
time this approach was used by US governmental 
agencies in environmental management (Hanley and 
Spash 1993). According to Guess and Farnham (2000), 
since 1960 the application of cost benefit analysis was 
expanded to “human beings” and “physical investment 
programs”. 
The decision of rejecting or accepting a program 
was made according to the benefits versus the costs of a 
program, if the benefits were greater than the costs or 
the same, the program would be accepted. In addition, 
the authors point out that cost benefit analysis were also 
used as a tool for policies evaluation and comparison, 
while the measure could change from benefits to 
efficiency, although the one who would enjoy the 
benefits would not be the agency that undertook the 
project. 
Cargo screening processes are used to detect 
different threats such as nuclear, chemical and 
radiological weapons, smuggling and contraband and 
sometimes even stowaways. While protecting against 
threats the port operator’s interest is to keep the port 
performance as smooth as possible. To screen all sea 
freight is a challenging task because of the huge volume 
of goods that pass around the globe annually. Branch 
(1986) argues that the amount of cargo flows in the 
seaports is more than 90% of total volume of worldwide 
cargo, which represents approximately 99% of the 
impact on the economy of the world. 
In addition to the huge volume of cargo, very little is 
known about efficiency of the technology which is 
used. Some manufacturers have benchmarks, but the 
benchmarks are valid according to an experimental 
environment rather than to a real world. It is very rare to 
find unbiased benchmarks that were made according to 
the real world. 
In this paper we examine different probabilistic 
techniques that are used for conducting cost benefit 
analysis, in particular we focus on scenario analysis, 
decision trees and simulation. We explore the 
advantages and disadvantages of using these tools, 
while conducting the cost benefit analysis of different 
cargo screening policies. The aim is a comparison of 
different strategies and identification of the data 
requirements for cost benefit analysis and how they can 
be used in security research. 
Our main research hypothesis is that simulation is 
the more suitable tool than decision tree and scenario 
analysis in conduction of cost benefit analysis while 
dealing with security issues and cargo screening. In 
addition we compare and examine the data requirements 
and results between scenario analysis decision tree and 
simulation while implementing different search 
strategies. This will allow us to produce a data 
requirement analysis that can be used in security 
research. 
In comparison with other techniques, such as cost 
effectiveness and cost utility analysis, cost benefit 
analysis has an advantage of comparison between wider 
scopes of possibilities. However, sometimes it is 
impossible to give a monetary value to the costs or to 
the benefits (Guess and Farnham 2000). Sekine et al. 
(2006) suggest using Pareto efficiency set to compare 
between different inspection policies. 
Our aim is to apply these approaches in a real 
world situation; as a result a case study approach is 
chosen as a most suitable research method for the data 
collection. Furthermore, Farrow and Shapiro (2009) 
identify that the literature dealing with the cost benefit 
analysis is often based on a case study methodology 
while focusing at a sensitive topic such as security 
policy. 
We adopt the assumption made by Kleindorfer and 
Saad (2005) that every business is interested in the trade 
off between the costs of risk mitigation investments and 
the expected losses of the potential disruptions. 
Therefore, cost-benefit analysis provides a good tool to 
investigate different cargo screening scenarios. In 
addition, we attempt to advance the use of simulation as 
a powerful tool at the operational and strategic level. In 
combination with cost benefit analysis, we intend to 
give it broader use when dealing with security issues. 
We investigate our hypothesis by first comparing 
the results of different scenarios by using scenario 
analysis, decision trees and simulation. We also validate 
our basic simulation by comparing its results with the 
results from the decision tree. Afterwards we compare 
the monetary values of different screening policies 
using scenario analysis, decision tree and simulation. 
Our results show that simulation is more powerful 
and flexible than decision trees, while decision trees are 
more detailed than scenario analysis. Furthermore, we 
find scenario analysis very general and not as sensitive 
or flexible. However, this approach requires less data 
than others. Both simulation and decision trees allow us 
to conduct a basic what if analysis, e.g. setting the 
queue to a fixed maximum capacity. However, the 
manipulation of parameters is much more convenient in 
simulation. Moreover, realistic traffic patterns and 
queuing discipline cannot easily be replicated in 
decision trees. 
Overall, our results and conclusions lead us to a 
data requirement analysis that can be used in security 
research. For our further research we want to apply our 
findings from current paper to our next case study that 
will take place during this year in the port of Dover. In 
addition, our results help to the other users to decide 
which technique is an appropriate for them and suitable 
according to the data available and to the detailed level 
of results they want to achieve. 
This paper contains four sections as follows: 
Section two contains the background of previous 
research about risk, risk management, scenario analysis; 
decision trees, simulation and cost benefit analysis. In 
section three, we introduce our case study and the 
comparison of the approaches used on its basis. Section 
four contains our findings and conclusions. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we present the background to the 
methods we use. In addition, we provide a basic 
definition of risk. We define a risk as a threat that has a 
probability to occur vs. consequences (The Royal 
Society, 2002; Sheffi 2005). As a part of the risk 
management we compare different approaches that can 
be used for the policies comparison and express the 
results in the monetary values. 
 
2.1. Scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis is often used to analyse possible 
future scenarios by considering possible best, worst, and 
average outcomes. According to Damodaran, (2007) 
this technique is suitable for single events. According to 
Daellenbach and McNickle (2005), any business faces 
uncertainty and as a result creates an unlimited number 
of possible futures to be considered. However, the 
number of possible scenarios to be considered is limited 
to three or four in scenario analysis. 
 
2.2. Decision trees 
A decision tree is a decision support tool (diagram) used 
in operational research. It can be helpful in deciding 
about strategies and dealing with conditional 
probabilities. According to Anderson et al. (1985) 
decision trees are a part of the decision theory approach 
widely used by decision makers while dealing with few 
possible solutions. Decision trees are diagrams that can 
be used to represent decision problems so that their 
structure is made clearer. Unlike decision tables, 
decision trees can be used to represent problems 
involving sequences of decisions, where decisions have 
to be made at different stages in the problem. 
 
2.3. Simulation 
Simulation is widely used in the supply chain. 
According to Turner and Williams (2005), modelling 
complicated supply chain systems gives the ability to 
experiment with different scenarios and has the power 
of generalization of the insight on the performance of 
the complicated systems. 
In addition, Wilson (2005) also confirms the 
usefulness of simulation for this and states that 
“Simulation modeling allows the analysis or prediction 
of operational effectiveness, efficiency, and detection 
rates (performance) of existing or proposed security 
systems under different configurations or operating 
policies before the existing systems are actually 
changed or a new system is built, eliminating the risk of 
unforeseen bottlenecks, under- or over-utilization of 
resources, or failure to meet specified security system 
requirements”. The author suggests making 
assumptions in order to simplify the model, but on the 
other hand he suggests achieving flexibility in the 
model. 
 
2.4. Cost benefit analysis 
As we already have mentioned in the introduction 
part, cost benefit analysis is an approach that has a long 
implication history. In economic literature, it is 
compared with cost effectiveness and cost utility 
analysis. The difference between these three approaches 
that the cost benefit analysis allows a comparison of 
wider range of scenarios, because the costs and the 
results have a monetary expression unlike two other 
techniques that are observed by using a single result 
every time. 
In the medical literature, we find a successful use 
of simulation for cost benefit analysis. For example, 
Habbema et al. (1987) suggest simulation as an 
appropriate technique to conduct the cost benefit 
analysis to compare two different screening policies, 
where “screening” refers to cancer screening. The 
authors use a micro simulation approach to explore 
different scenarios and their outputs. Similar to 
Habbema et al. (1987) Pilgrim et al. (2009) suggest 
conducting a cost effectiveness analysis for cancer 
screening policies while using discrete event simulation. 
The authors support their choice of methodology with 
previous research using the same research strategy. 
Jacobson et al. (2006) suggest the cost benefit 
analysis in evaluation of cost effectiveness while 
screening 100% of the cargo and using single or double 
devices. The authors propose a model to measure costs 
versus benefits while using different configurations of 
explosive detection systems and explosive trace 
detection machines in US airports. They suggest a cost 
model that contains direct costs and indirect costs 
associated with costs of false clears, this cost is based 
on subjective probability to occur. After introducing the 
model the authors assume that this indirect cost is large 
and very difficult to estimate and propose a model 
without it. 
In the next section we present our research 
question and afterwards the case study, on its basis we 
will examine the scenario analysis decision tree and 
simulation approaches for the cost benefit analysis. 
 
3. CASE STUDY 
In order to achieve our research aim (comparing 
scenario analysis, decision trees and simulation for a 
cost benefit analysis) we chose a case study approach as 
our research methodology. Our first case study involves 
the cargo screening facilities of the ferry port of Calais 
(France). We conduct this case study in collaboration 
with the UK Border Agency (UKBA). Calais was 
chosen for the following reasons: the limited number of 
links – Calais operates only with Dover leading to a 
simple cargo flow and there is only one major threat of 
interest to the British government (clandestines). 
Clandestines are people who are trying to enter the UK 
illegally – i.e. without having proper papers and 
documents. 
In Calais there are two security areas, one is 
operated by French authorities and the other one is 
operated by UK Border Agency. According to the data 
that we have collected from the field between April 
2007 and April 2008 about 900,000 lorries passed the 
border and approximately 0.4% of the lorries had 
additional human freight (UKBA 2008). 
For our case study, we have conducted scenario 
analysis, built a decision tree that fully represents the 
flow inside our system and have built a simulation 
model of the system using the same input data as in the 
decision tree. Comparing and contrasting results of 
both, decision tree and simulation, allowed us to 
validate the models. 
While we used Microsoft Excel and simple 
spreadsheet calculation for modelling our decision trees 
our Monte Carlo and then discrete event simulation was 
built using AnyLogic software (XJ Technologies 2010). 
The process flow representation in the simulation is 
equivalent to the decision tree layout. However, the 
simulation uses probabilities and frequency 
distributions, e.g. exponential arrival times of lorries. 
This randomness (e.g. slightly different number of 
arrivals each time) requires us to undertake several 
replications of each simulation scenario and calculate 
the means of the simulation model outputs. These 
means we compare with the results of the decision tree 
to validate our model. Then we conduct a range of 
experiments by using all three approaches, we translate 
the results to the monetary value and compare the 
outcomes. 
We then extend the simulation by changing arrival 
times from simple exponential distributions to more 
realistic traffic patterns such as peak hours and seasonal 
patterns. In addition, we modify our simulation model 
by adding maximum queue capacities various stations 
in the system. If a queue reaches its capacity, lorries 
will bypass the station without checks. These 
modifications reflect the real world and make our 
simulation model more realistic than the decision tree 
(which then has the ability to change the results). 
 
3.1. Common data used for all the approaches 
The common data that we use for all three scenarios is 
summarised in the next table: 
 
Table 1: Common Data 
Total number of lorries 900,000 
Cost per missed positive lorry £400,000 
Cost to increase searches by 0% £0 
Cost to increase searches by 10% £5,000,000 
Cost to increase searches by 20% £10,000,000 
Current number of positive lorries found  
France (end1) 1,800 
UK Shed (end2) 890 
UK Berth (end3) 784 
UK total (end2 + end3) 1,674 
Estimate of positive lorries not detected 150 
 
We consider two factors with three scenarios each in 
our scenario analysis: Traffic growth and clandestine 
growth (Table 2). For each factor and scenario 
combination, we have estimated the probability of it 
happening, as described in the following paragraphs. 
The question we are trying to answer is how the UK 
Border Agency (UKBA) should respond to these 
scenarios. We assume that there are three possible 
responses: increasing the searches by either 0%, 10% or 
20%. 
Traffic growth represents the percentage increase 
in lorry traffic that passes through Calais. Exact 
forecasts for traffic growth vary, but Calais port is 
already planning to open a second terminal by around 
2020. By then roughly a doubling of traffic is expected, 
i.e. +100% in ten years. Thus an annual traffic growth 
of 0%-20% seems a realistic factor range, with an 
increase of 10% most likely. It is assumed that any 
increase in traffic is proportional, i.e. the ratio of soft to 
hard sided lorries remains the same. 
The second factor under consideration is 
clandestine growth. This is the most unpredictable of 
the three factors, as clandestine numbers greatly vary 
from year to year based largely on external factors such 
as the economic attractiveness of the UK, the number 
and intensity of wars and other conflicts worldwide and 
other political initiatives. 
Local aspects also play a role, for example an 
increase in searches in Calais can displace clandestines 
to other nearby ports and vice versa. Due to the 
uncertainty attached to this factor, a range of +25% to -
50% is considered, with all scenarios being equally 
likely. A higher maximum decrease than increase is 
assumed to the recent clearing in late 2009 of the Calais 
“jungle” (illegal encampment of clandestines near the 
port). We will assume in the following that any changes 
in clandestine numbers will proportionally effect 
successful and unsuccessful clandestines. 
 
Table 2: two factors with three scenarios and one 
decision variable with three options. 
 
Combining the above information, we arrive at the 
following combined probabilities of each scenario to 
occur: 
 
Table 3: combined probabilities assuming independence 
of probabilities 
 -50% CG 0% CG +25% CG 
0% TG 0.083 0.083 0.083 
10% TG 0.167 0.167 0.167 
20% TG 0.083 0.083 0.083 
 
It is estimated by the UKBA that each clandestine that 
reaches the UK costs the government approximately 
£20,000 per year. Moreover, it is estimated that he 
average duration of a stay of a clandestine in the UK is 
five years, so the total cost of each clandestine slipping 
through the search in Calais is £100,000. 
The cost for increasing the search capacity in 
Calais is more difficult to estimate, as there is a mixture 
of fixed and variable cost and operations are often 
jointly performed by French, British and private 
contractors. However, if we concentrate on UKBA’s 
costs, we can arrive at some reasonable estimates, if we 
assume that any increase in searches would result in a 
percentage increase in staff and infrastructure cost. Thus 
we estimate that a 10% increase in search activity (10% 
SG) would cost £5M and a 20% increase £10M (20% 
SG). 
Search growth describes the percentage increase in 
search activity by the UK Border Agency (UKBA). 
Currently, UKBA searches 33% of traffic. To keep this 
proportion stable, UKBA will need to respond to a 
growth in traffic by increasing the number of lorries it 
searches. At the same time, there is political pressure to 
search more vehicles, whilst budget pressures limit the 
number of vehicles that can be inspected. Thus we 
assume that search growth may also vary between 0% 
and 20%. As before, we assume that any increase in 
search activity is proportional to hard and soft sided 
lorries. 
As the status quo is 33% of vehicles are searched 
by UKBA, we can calculate resultant percentages of 
vehicles searched by combining the above two factors 
(assuming linear relationships). For example, if traffic 
increase is matched by search increase, this will remain 
the same. Or if there is a +10% traffic growth and +0% 
search growth results in 33% * (100%/110%) = 30% of 
vehicles searched. 
A key question is the relationship between the 
percentage of vehicles searched versus the number of 
clandestines found or more importantly, the number of 
clandestines not found. At a search intensity of 33%, 
UKBA finds approximately 1,674 lorries in Calais with 
additional cargo. A best estimate of “successful” 
clandestines is approximately 50 per month (600 per 
year) or 150 lorries per year. Establishing a clear 
relationship between these 150 and the figure of 1,674 
is difficult, as 1,674 lorries does not represent unique 
attempts by the clandestines. Unsuccessful clandestines 
will try time after time. 
It is probably a fair assumption that an increase in 
searches will yield a decrease in the number of 
successful clandestines and vice versa. In absence of 
further information and considering that the variation of 
percentage of searches is in a relatively limited range of 
27.5% to 39.6%, we will make the same assumption 
here as in the rest of the scenario analysis: the 
relationship between both parameters is linear. Based on 
this, we obtain the number of clandestines missed as 
given in Table 2, e.g. searching only 30% of traffic 
results in 600* (33%/30%) = 660 missed clandestines. 
 
3.2. Calais Scenario Analysis 
We use different methods for estimating the ‘adjusted’ 
number of positive lorries found if there is no growth of 
positive lorries. Once we have the matrix (iteration over 
our two factors) we conduct some data analysis to 
estimate the costs. The data analysis is the same for all 
the different approaches we will present. 
We demonstrate this for scenario analysis and for 
all others we will only report on the key outputs 
(adjusted number of positive lorries found for CG=0, 
total expected costs). Finally, we will compare the 
expected costs that resulted from the different models. 
 
Table 4- Proportion of vehicles searched 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 0.3300 0.3630 0.3960 
TG 10% 0.3000 0.3300 0.3600 
TG 20% 0.2750 0.3025 0.3300 
 
Table 5 is the result from the scenario analysis: number 
of positive lorries found. The cost estimation that 
follows below is the same for all methods discussed in 
this paper and will only be shown once in detail. 
Traffic 
Growth (TG) 
p 
(TG) 
Clandestine 
Growth (CG) 
p 
(CG) 
Search 
Growth (SG) 
+0% 0.25 -50% 0.33 +0% 
+10% 0.5 +0% 0.33 +10% 
+20% 0.25 +25% 0.33 +20% 
 
Table 5: Adjusted number of positive lorries found if 
CG = 0%. Calculated based on Table 4 where 0.3300 
represents 1,674 lorries. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1674.0 1841.4 2008.8 
TG 10% 1521.8 1674.0 1826.2 
TG 20% 1395.0 1534.5 1674.0 
 
Table 6: Relative number of positive lorries found when 
compared to base scenario if CG = 0% 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1 1.1 1.2 
TG 10% 0.909091 1 1.090909 
TG 20% 0.833333 0.916667 1 
 
Table 7: Number of positive lorries missed if CG = 0%. 
Calculated based on the probabilities in Table 4, where 
0.3300 results in 150 missed positive lorries. Similar 
Tables can be computed for the other CG values. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 150.0 136.4 125.0 
TG 10% 165.0 150.0 137.5 
TG 20% 180.0 163.6 150.0 
 
Table 8: Cost of extra searches – as mentioned before. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% £0 £5,000,000 £10,000,000 
TG 10% £0 £5,000,000 £10,000,000 
TG 20% £0 £5,000,000 £10,000,000 
 
Table 9: Relative number of positive lorries missed 
compared to the base scenario (inverse of Table 6) 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1.00 0.91 0.83 
TG 10% 1.10 1.00 0.92 
TG 20% 1.20 1.09 1.00 
 
Table 10: Expected costs excluding SG costs for CG = 
0%. Calculated by combining the information of table 8 
with that of Table 9, where 1.00 means 150 lorries at a 
cost of £400,000 each. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% £60,000,000 £59,545,455 £60,000,000 
TG 10% £66,000,000 £65,000,000 £65,000,000 
TG 20% £72,000,000 £70,454,545 £70,000,000 
 
Table 10 can be used to calculate the tables for CG=-
50% and CG=25% by multiplying each value in the 
table with 1+CG(x) where CG(x) is the proportion of 
Clandestine Growth. 
Overall, we can conclude from the scenario 
analysis that the best option seems to be to change SG 
by 10%. In our decision tree and simulation we use the 
same assumptions, same costs and same scenarios as 
described above. However, when we use additional data 
for an approach we will state it in the relevant section. 
 
3.3. Calais Decision Tree 
In order to conduct a comparison between different 
techniques we will use for the decision tree the same 
scenarios that we have used for the scenario analysis. 
Also, here we will consider the same two factors: traffic 
growth and clandestine growth and as a reaction search 
growth. We investigate what is an appropriate policy 
that UKBA should adopt according to the decision tree. 
In addition we want to know the difference in the data 
inputs and outputs between these approaches. 
For our case study we have built a decision tree 
that fully represents the flow inside our system (Figure 
1). Building both allows us to check the results and 
validate the models as the results should be identical. 
 
Figure 1: Decision Tree 
 
 
 
 
Building the decision tree using probabilities demands 
more data on the one hand; however it allows us to 
receive more precise outcomes on the other hand. Due 
to the sensitivity of the data we change the numerical 
probabilities in the decision tree to their equivalent in 
words (see Table 1). 
 
Table 11: probabilities that are used in the decision tree 
and their equivalent in words. 
Probabilities p>50% 10%<p50% 1%<p10% p1% 
Equivalence large medium small very small 
 
 
From the decision tree we can calculate the following 
results, which are identical to the scenario analysis, 
apart from small rounding errors (due to more complex 
spreadsheet calculations). 
 
Table 12: Decision Tree results: Number of positive 
lorries found if CG = 0%. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1674 1841 2008 
TG 10% 1522 1674 1826 
TG 20% 1395 1534 1674 
 
Using the same combined probabilities for each 
scenario as we have used in scenario analysis we find 
that the results between two approaches are almost 
identical in the monetary value and according to both of 
them we should adopt the same search strategy. Overall 
we conclude from the decision tree that the best option 
seems to be to change SG by 10%. 
 
3.4. Calais Simulation 
Besides the data already mentioned we have collected 
data on operation times of the activities in the shed and 
the berth and from ferry operation manuals. We have 
used the decision tree graphical representation as a 
conceptual model basis for the Monte Carlo Simulation 
and Discrete Event Simulation implementation. 
 
Figure 2: The French site (AnyLogic Simulation) 
 
 
 
We use the same simulation model for both, Monte 
Carlo Simulation and Discrete Event Simulation. The 
parameter set loaded in the initialisation phase of the 
simulation determines the type of simulation that will 
be run. 
The first parameter set sets all delay times to zero 
and all queue sizes to 1,000,000. This allows emulating 
a Monte Carlo Simulation where all events are executed 
in the correct sequence but the time it takes to execute 
them is zero. 
The second parameter set defines triangular 
frequency distributions for the delay times (based on 
our collected case study data), sets all queue sizes to 
1,000,000, and defines the resources that are available 
(based on our collected case study data). Queue sizes 
can later be restricted by defining routing rules. 
For both, Monte Carlo Simulation and Discrete 
Event Simulation, routing decision (e.g. which lorries to 
inspect and how to inspect them) are derived from 
uniform probability distributions (given probabilities 
are based on our collected case study data). 
Having stochastic inputs means that we also have 
stochastic outputs. Therefore, we have to do multiple 
runs. We have conducted some tests to determine the 
number of replication required using confidence 
intervals (95%) following the guidelines in Robinson 
(2004). The test result suggests to run at least 8 
replications. To be on the safe side we decided to do 10 
replication for each iteration of our experiments. To 
report our experimental results we use mean value as a 
point estimator and standard deviation as an estimator 
of the variability of the results. 
 
3.5. Monte Carlo Simulation 
We have run all scenarios as defined in the previous 
sections. The results are as follows: 
 
Table 13: Monte Carlo Simulation results: Number of 
positive lorries found if CG = 0%. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1678.75 1846.25 2027.75 
TG 10% 1531.30 1674.15 1827.50 
TG 20% 1404.25 1540.90 1670.70 
 
Comparing the results with the ones from decision trees 
shows the following: 
 
Table 14: Comparing Decision Tree Results with Monte 
Carlo Simulation results (errors) 
SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
-5.0 -5.2 -19.4 
-9.6 -0.4 -1.7 
-9.4 -6.6 3.0 
 
We find that the differences are relatively small and can 
be attributed to the fact that we use a stochastic method. 
There are different types of simulation. In this paper we 
look at static discrete stochastic simulation (Monte 
Carlo Simulation) and dynamic discrete stochastic 
simulation (Discrete Event Simulation. The difference 
between these simulation approaches is that in Monte 
Carlo Simulation time does not play natural role but in 
Discrete Event Simulation it is (Kelton et al., 2010). 
While the first is often used in risk assessment the 
second is often used when further investigation into the 
system behaviour on the operational level are required 
for the decision making. 
Therefore, for our comparison of probabilistic risk 
analysis methods we use a Monte Carlo Simulation 
model. We then extend this Monte Carlo Simulation 
model to a Discrete Event Simulation model by adding 
elements that are linked to time (e.g. arrival rates, 
delays, queues) and constraints that are linked to time 
(e.g. queue size restrictions) and new performance 
measures linked to time (e.g. utilisation, time in system, 
max queue length) in order to demonstrate the full 
power of simulation as a tool in the decision making 
process. 
As we mentioned before we use the same 
combined probabilities for each scenario as we have 
used in scenario analysis and decision tree. We find that 
the simulation results are similar to the other two 
approaches. Although here, according to the simulation 
outcomes we should adopt the same search strategy, e.g. 
SG 10%. The difference in the monetary value between 
simulation and other two approaches is very as result of 
calculating the costs according to the averages (decision 
tree and scenario analysis) vs. according to the output 
for the simulation. 
 
3.6. Discrete Event Simulation – DES 0 
In aim to upgrade our model to Discrete Event 
Simulation we have added additional data that 
represents the real world situation. The extra data that 
we use is service times and resources we run our 
simulation again to check if this additional data makes 
an effect on the results. We find that the impact is very 
small and as a result we would choose the same strategy 
as before SG 10%. 
 
Table 15: Standard Discrete Event Simulation Results: 
Number of positive lorries found if CG = 0%.  
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1674.50 1833.00 2013.90 
TG 10% 1512.00 1667.20 1818.15 
TG 20% 1387.65 1527.90 1694.20 
 
To show the additional possibilities of Discrete Event 
Simulation we have added some additional features we 
want to demonstrate here: These are (1) variable arrival 
rates, (2) queue size restrictions at sheds UK and (3) 
combination of first two features. 
 
3.6.1. Variable arrival rates – DES 1 
After running the Discrete Event Simulation with 
variable arrival rates we find that also here the results 
are very similar to previous runs and scenarios and the 
appropriate strategy to adopt is SG 10%. The monetary 
difference is very small. The results are logical if there 
is no queue capacity involved and the only change is at 
the arrival rates. 
 
Table 16: Discrete Event Simulation with Variable 
Arrival Rates results: Number of positive lorries found 
if CG = 0%. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1681.55 1843.00 2008.70 
TG 10% 1519.25 1687.20 1852.85 
TG 20% 1385.05 1534.85 1658.85 
 
 
3.6.2. Queue size restrictions at sheds UK – DES 2 
At this stage we run the Discrete Event Simulation 
while queue capacity is set, we find that here the results 
are different than in previous runs and scenarios, but the 
appropriate strategy to adopt is still SG 10%. The 
monetary difference is bigger. Although, we find that 
these results are logical the queue capacity only has its 
impact on the system but this effect is not big enough to 
make change in the strategy. 
 
Table 17: Discrete Event Simulation with Queue Size 
Restrictions results: Number of positive lorries found if 
CG = 0%. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1666.95 1833.30 1998.90 
TG 10% 1507.80 1657.85 1795.35 
TG 20% 1383.90 1526.70 1653.95 
 
 
3.6.3. Variable arrival rates and queue size 
restrictions at sheds UK – DES 3 
As a final stage for this paper we have combined the 
two previous scenarios for Discrete Event Simulation: 
the arrival rate and queue capacity. From the results at 
this stage we find that the most appropriate strategy to 
adopt is to keep SG 0%. The reason for the different 
outcome lies in the combination of arrival rates and 
queue capacity, when the effort to search more is 
wasted by queue jumping during the peak times. 
 
Table 18: Discrete Event Simulation with Variable 
Arrival Rates and Queue Size Restrictions results: 
Number of positive lorries found if CG = 0%. 
TG vs. SG SG 0% SG +10% SG +20% 
TG 0% 1626.35 1788.10 1891.50 
TG 10% 1500.75 1619.15 1731.25 
TG 20% 1374.8 1492 1600.9 
 
 
 
4. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS 
We managed to gain similar results for all methods we 
looked at, e.g. scenario analysis, decision tree and 
simulation (Monte-Carlo). The simulation (DE) results 
are different from the other approaches and as we 
explained in the relevant section are logical.  
 
Table 19: Overall cost comparisons of all 
methodologies. 
 Total expected costs 
Option 1: SG=0% 2: SG=10% 3: SG=20% 
Cheapest 
option 
SA £60,500,000 £60,000,000 £60,416,667 2 
DT £60,497,446 £60,000,000 £60,418,795 2 
MCS £60,335,818 £60,058,184 £60,461,341 2 
DES 0 £60,797,873 £60,250,740 £60,350,102 2 
DES 1 £60,881,284 £60,017,602 £60,406,308 2 
DES 2 £60,714,953 £60,166,442 £60,857,915 2 
DES 3 £59,817,382 £60,116,618 £61,624,835 1 
 
 
Table 20: Relative cost comparisons of all 
methodologies. 
 Relative difference from lowest costs 
Option 1: SG=0% 2: SG=10% 3: SG=20% 
Cheapest 
option 
SA £500,000 £0 £416,667 2 
DT £497,446 £0 £418,795 2 
MCS £277,633 £0 £403,156 2 
DES 0 £547,133 £0 £99,362 2 
DES 1 £863,682 £0 £388,706 2 
DES 2 £548,511 £0 £691,473 2 
DES 3 £0 £299,236 £1,807,453 1 
 
 
However, to advice which technology to use when and 
what is involved regarding factors like data requirement 
etc. we suggest to use the next table: 
 
Table 21: Factors to take into consideration before 
making decisions (SA – Scenario Analysis, DT – 
Decision Tree, MC – Monte Carlo Simulation, DES – 
Discrete Event Simulation) 
 
 SA DT MC DES 
Discrete / 
Continuous D D C C 
Correlated / 
Independent C I both both Risk type 
Sequential / 
Concurrent C S both both 
Strategic / 
Operational S S S O Decision process Broad / 
Detailed B B B D 
Complexity L M H H 
Data 
requirements L L M H 
Tool costs L L M H 
Training 
costs L L H H 
Model 
Characteristics: 
Low, Medium, 
High 
Assumptions H M L L 
 
While dealing with continuous types of risks the 
simulation approach will be more suitable and it does 
not depend if the risk type is correlated or independent, 
sequential or concurrent. However, for scenario analysis 
and decision tree the situation is different. The scenario 
analysis can be used for correlated, concurrent and 
discrete type of risk while decision trees can be used for 
independent, sequential and discrete types. 
The decision process level and the information 
required for our three basic approaches will be similarly 
applied at the strategic level and require broad 
information. On the other hand Discrete Event 
Simulation requires detailed information and can be 
applied on the operational level. 
Total costs of the approaches (including training 
costs) vary from low for scenario analysis (that require 
just pen and paper) and decision trees to high for 
simulation. 
Our future plans are to get away from probabilistic 
routing to factual routing. This means abandoning 
probabilities at the routing decision points and making 
the decision based on the attributes of the object that is 
at the decision point. The attribute would be clandestine 
on board, and the correct decision would be made based 
on a probability. This allows us to integrate (and test) 
different detection rates for different sensors.  
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